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Abstract 
The apparently-intrinsic juxtaposition of Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
René Magritte seems to provide some further clarification for the 
work of the Austrian philosopher as well as a theoretical framework 
to the work of the Belgian artist.  
What leads Wittgenstein to state that the word “red” has nothing to 
do with the colour red? What leads Magritte to maintain that a pipe 
“is not a pipe”? They both believe in the centrality of Saussure’s 
principle of the arbitrariness of the sign, thus supporting a 
semiotically-oriented solution. 
 
 
La juxtaposition apparemment intrinsèque entre Ludwig 
Wittgenstein et René Magritte semble apporter quelques 
précisions au travail du philosophe autrichien ainsi qu’un cadre 
théorique pour le travail de l’artiste belge. Qu’est-ce qui conduit 
Wittgenstein à dire que le mot “rouge”  n’a rien à voir avec la 
couleur rouge? Qu’est-ce qui conduit Magritte à dire qu’une pipe  
“n’est pas une pipe”? Tous les deux croient en la centralité du 
principe de l’arbitrarité du signe de Saussure, en favorisant ainsi 
une solution qui est orientée vers le sémiotique. 
 
L’accostamento, apparentemente estrinseco, tra Ludwig 
Wittgenstein e René Magritte, tende a offrire un’ulteriore 
chiarificazione dell’opera del filosofo austriaco e a fornire una 
cornice teorica all’opera dell’artista belga.  
Cos’è che fa dire a Wittgenstein che la parola “rosso” non ha nulla 
a che vedere con il colore rosso e a Magritte che il disegno di una 
pipa “non è una pipa”? Entrambi assumono come centrale il 
principio (di matrice saussuriana) dell’arbitrarietà del segno, si 
orientano, cioè, verso soluzioni di tipo “semiotico”. 
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While, on the one hand, the apparently-intrinsic combination 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein and René Magritte reveals the double 
advantage of providing some further clarification of the work 
of the Austrian philosopher, on the other it provides a 
theoretical framework to the work of the Belgian artist. 
It is a hermeneutical process - as one can guess - that draws 
on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953), a 
masterpiece in the 20th-century philosophy which brings 
about a radical change in a perception of language that is far 
away from the representational outcome of the Tractatus  
Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and more adequate in order to 
tackle the issues related to artistic languages. 
There is no natural connection between an object and the 
name which represents it: the meaning of a word - as 
famously stated by Wittgenstein (1953, our translation in 
English, p. 25) – “is its use in a given language”. This is the 
disruptive theoretical legacy provided by the analysis of the 
so-called “second” Wittgenstein. However what is the 
theoretical substratum that allows us to put into dialogue the 
Austrian philosopher with Magritte? What leads Wittgenstein 
to state that the word “red” has nothing to do with the colour 
red? (cf. ibid: 42) and Magritte to maintain that a pipe “is not 
a pipe”? Both of them - one explicitly, the other implicitly - 
support the central principle of Saussure’s arbitrariness of 
the language, i.e. the theory according to which the 
relationship between an object and the sign that denotes it is 
“unmotivated” (our translation in English; cf. Saussure 1922, 
p. 87). Hence, they both support a semiotically-oriented 
solution. 
 
 
 
1. The arbitrariness of the sign 
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It is interesting to observe that the issue of arbitrariness is 
dealt with in the same years by both Wittgenstein and 
Magritte. Although there is no evidence of either a direct or 
indirect acquaintance between the two, Suzi Gablik notes 
that “the affinity between the concerns of both is so 
impressive that even the images that occur often 
correspond” (our translation in English, Gablik 1970, p. 86). 
As early as 1933, from the drafting of a few notes that were 
then collected in two volumes known as The Blue Book and 
The Brown Paper - anticipating the Philosophical texts – one 
can notice the change of perspective in Wittgenstein’s 
thought. By rejecting what he had said in the Tractatus, he 
breaks with the tradition that postulates the 
correspondence (naturaliter) between names and items to 
state that only by means of the application of a name in a 
real context of discourse (its use) we can grasp its meaning. 
In the same years, Magritte’s paints The Human 
Condition (1933), in which he represents the old 
(Renaissance) question of the painting as a “window on 
reality”, but resolves it in a whole new way, that is, with the 
theme of “painting within a painting”: in the picture he depicts 
a canvas resting on an easel on which the (real?) landscape 
is painted, and one can see over the window sill. Merging 
together, canvas and landscape both incorporate the 
problematic nature of the relationship between reality and 
representation: if, at first, it seems that the real landscape is 
depicted through the window, the observer later realizes that 
even the latter is “fiction”, as it is part of the picture that is 
being viewed. 
Starting from the very first similarity between Wittgenstein 
and Magritte, the aim of our contribution is therefore to 
(re)present the two authors from a semiotic perspective, 
showing how in the production of the philosopher it is 
possible to identify an “aesthetic” reading and vice versa, i.e. 
how in artist’s work we can recognise a “philosophical” 
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reading; however, the objective of our study is to show the 
extent to which Wittgenstein represents a hermeneutic 
model for Magritte, and the extent to which Magritte is 
Wittgenstein’s (intersemiotic)12 further 
exemplification/translation3. 
 
 
2.From a picture theory of language to 
language games, from form to matter 
In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein is in 
favour of the so-called “picture theory of 
language”. According to such a theory, language would be 
nothing but the representation of facts4. 
The main distinction taking place within a language is 
between simple and complex propositions: the former 
representing a state of possible things, the latter deriving 
from the combination of simple propositions through truth-
functional operators5. Only these two types of propositions 
have sense. Complex propositions depend on the 
elementary ones at their basis, whose sense is in turn given 
by the fact that they present a state of possible things, i.e. a 
situation which may happen in the world. 
In order to clarify how a sentence represents a fact, Voltolini 
(1998: 18-19) resorts to an image. Suppose a master of 
fencing wants to explain his/her students how to make a 
move and paints two images that represent two fencers: in 
the sketch by the master one can identify a pose that his/her 
students can possibly assume (a state of possible things). If 
the two students actually took that position, the sketch would 
become the accurate, true representation of a state of real 
things. The Wittgensteinian propositions behave in the same 
way. 
However, in his Tractatus Wittgenstein poses another 
condition for a proposition to represent a fact, that is, 
the identity of logical form between reality and the 
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proposition. Language and reality are interconnected: the 
meaning of “names” consists of “simple objects” that are 
connected and constitute the state of things depicted in the 
propositions. Logic, therefore, is the mirror image of the 
world, but with a warning, which sounds a bit like a paradox6: 
it is the condition of significance of any language but cannot 
be represented since “in order to be able to represent logical 
form, we should be able to situate ourselves with the 
proposition outside of the logic, that is, out of the world” 
(Wittgenstein 1921, our translation in English, p. 24, § 
4.031). 
The theses contained in the Tractatus  are here in shorthand 
and have been immune to critical revisions for several 
years. A first reshuffle, however, emerges from his  
Philosophical Observations (1929-30), the first document 
that Wittgenstein wrote after years of silence that followed 
the publication of his masterpiece in 1921. The language 
begins to look more like a logical entity and the propositions 
are not only evaluated as mere representations of facts: the 
sense of the proposition - the Austrian philosopher states (cf. 
Wittgenstein 1964) - is its “purpose”. Understanding linguistic 
expressions - Wittgenstein maintains - does not exclusively 
depend on the logical domain, but also on the speakers’ 
“attitude”. The comprehension of the logical structure 
together with its constant starts to be associated with the 
concerns about what analytic philosophy called common 
speech and Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, in the ‘60s redefined as 
“parlare commune” (cf. Rossi-Landi 1961). For the first time 
we witness the introduction of a new term that is - borrowing 
Caputo’s terminology - the “matter” of language (see Caputo 
2000). 
Between 1933 and 1935, on occasion of two university 
courses, Wittgenstein prepared two notebooks for his 
students known as the Blue Book and the Brown Book: here 
- especially in the Book Brown - he introduces the concept 
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of Sprachspiele, i.e. “language games”, according to which 
language is a “game” and as such it is subject to 
“rules”. These rules, however, are not comparable to the 
strict laws of language as calculus. The language, argues 
the philosopher, is not governed by a strong rationale, but by 
habits and rules devised by men and as such they are 
modular and undeterminable7. 
It is in the Philosophical Investigations, however, that one 
can notice the dissolution of the logical and linguistic system 
at the basis of the Tractatus: we abandon the linguistic 
ontology, open we now explore routes that will take us to the 
pragmatics of language. Here follows what we can read in 
the introduction to his posthumous work published in 1953, 
two years after his death, and which is to be considered 
among the most fruitful philosophical innovations of the last 
century: 
 
Four years ago I had the opportunity to read my first book 
[the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus] and explain the ideas 
that were expressed in it. Suddenly I realized that I could 
publish my old thoughts together with the new ones, and that 
my new thoughts would emerge only if I put them in contrast 
with my old way of thinking and against its background 
(Wittgenstein 1953, our translation in English, p. 4) . 
 
The criticism against the Tractatus is mainly carried out in 
propositions 1-137 and is articulated as follows (see Voltolini 
1998: 11-12): 
- §§ 1-64: criticism against the theory of denotation and 
the representational theory of the meaning of propositions;  
- §§ 65-81: introduction to the concept of “family 
resemblances” between objects that fall under the same 
concept; 
- §§ 81-88: anticipation of the issue of “rule-following”8; 
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- §§ 89-137: criticism against the idea that philosophy 
should deal with the essence of things. 
In this way, it seems that Wittgenstein wants to permanently 
put philosophy aside. Indeed, he gives it a new and difficult 
task, which is far away from metaphysics, but which is not 
necessarily less challenging: the task of describing 
language as it is, with the therapeutic aim of abandoning the 
conceptual misunderstandings that we encounter and which 
cause us to “idle” when we face problems of any kind. It is 
only through this philosophy that we can fight the 
“enchantment of the intellect”, because this is the only 
philosophy that can “show the fly the way out of the trap” 
(ibid.: 66). 
One of the main causes of misunderstanding - Wittegenstein 
states (ibid.: 69) - is the fact that “we do not clearly see the 
use of words” and that our grammar “lacks of 
perspicuity”. Philosophy, therefore, has the task of clarifying 
language, showing the rules of use for a given term and - 
unexpectedly in tune with the paradigm of differential 
Structuralism - explaining the differences and 
the similarities with the other terms. 
Language, as the Austrian philosopher convincingly argues 
by abandoning the picture theory of language and decreeing 
the end of (onto)logic identity between the proposition and 
the fact, has a wide expressive variety, that is determined 
and irreducible to its merely representative function. The aim 
of “representing facts” is only one of the functions of 
language, which are governed, rather, by a participatory 
approach that embraces the determined and the 
undetermined, the accuracy of the calculation and the 
ambiguity of speech, the logical and the pre-logical, the 
precise and the vague, the intensive and the extensive, as 
Louis Hjelmslev would say9. 
The criticism of Wittgenstein’s theory of denotation is not 
indiscriminate. Since the first propositions of 
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its Investigations criticizing St. Augustine and the theory of 
ostensive definition, Wittgenstein asserts that “Augustine 
describes [...] a system of communication; however, not all 
that we call language belongs to such a system” (ibid.: 
10). Hence, Wittgenstein does not reject the idea of 
denotation from the facts of language, but he merely 
demonstrates it is inadequate. Languages, in fact, have 
many features which are not just denotative: had it not been 
so, speakers would probably not fall into (frequent) episodes 
of misunderstanding and languages would not be ambiguous 
(ambiguity being their hallmark). However, though assuming 
that the denotation was the only function of language, 
“saying, ‘every word [...] designates something’ we have not 
yet said anything at all” (ibid.: 17). In fact, even if we allowed 
all words to have a reference and semantic differences to be 
descended exclusively from their reference to different 
things, such a reference would derive from the evidence that 
terms are used in different ways. This explains why the 
meaning of a given expression is the use we make of it, not 
its referent. That is why the word “red” has nothing to do with 
the colour “red”. 
 
 
3. The betrayal of images 
Renè Magritte, the surrealist painter disinclined to labels and 
roles, represents, on the one hand - as we shall see below - 
a thinking way of painting  which provides us with factual 
reflections in the field of semiotics and philosophy of the 
language; from the other - as we say at the end of our study 
- a sort of test of Wittgenstein’s theoretical elaboration. 
Luciano Ponzio states (2010: 154): 
In Magritte's paintings the general intent is to cast doubt on 
the reductive cultural habits, on the visual habits associated 
with symbolic sign, with the “thirdness” (following Peirce’s 
terminology), that is, with the conventional, with what is 
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usually assumed as the “real”, what is not necessarily the 
way it is (the indexical, the “secondness”, our translation in 
English). 
On the contrary, L. Ponzio continues, it is the “urgent 
[...]transition to the iconic, the firstness, the possible, and 
therefore innovation, inventiveness, re-creation” (ibid.) of the 
visions of world: 
In Magritte, this takes place by means of a standard 
representation, with the fully realistic precision of familiar 
objects which are part of our everyday life, but which 
produce a “surprise” effect, thanks to the way they are 
combined, assembled together, or to the relationship they 
have with a sentence, with the framework, or with its title [...]; 
they thus generate a paradox. In such a process, the context 
plays a pivotal role. The effect of “alienation” - to borrow an 
expression from the Russian formalists - is rendered through 
the strangeness of the report, of the position, of the 
connection in which we discover what may appear to be 
obvious, clear, normal (ibid., our translation in English). 
Like Wittgenstein, also Magritte intends to break the tie that 
binds the object to the sign. Magritte’s conception about the 
possibility of an object to be depicted begins to develop 
thanks to a series of paintings that has as its pilot 
painting The betrayal of images and its later versions. As is 
well known, the details change according to the version: the 
first painting represents a pipe with the inscription “this is not 
a pipe”; the painting is then reproduced with a change in its 
details and by increasing the sense of uncertainty that the 
observation of the picture initiates. As noted by Foucault 
(see 1978), we move from the bewilderment given by the 
simplicity of the first version, to the confusion coming from 
the many questions following the observation of one of the 
latest versions which represent the same pipe with the same 
inscription, but enclosed in a frame, above which is another 
pipe suspended in the air. 
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“Who could smoke a pipe in my picture? - asks Magritte. No 
one. So IT IS NOT A PIPE” (Magritte 1979 our translation in 
English, p. 214)10 . In fact, after an initial disorientation, what 
appears to be a paradox is resolved by a reflection that leads 
us to determine that the object represented is not a pipe, but 
its image: “for those who can read – we agree with L. Ponzio 
- writing does not illustrate the word, and the word is not the 
caption of the image” (L. Ponzio 2010: 76): 
The strange combination in which the painting represents the 
objects - because, they are realistically, conventionally, 
precisely, meticulously represented, to be prototypes - like 
the images accompanying definitions in a dictionary or that 
are generally used in order to learn to read a primer - makes 
them get out of the familiar context in which we are more 
likely to see them and in which they appear as ordinary, 
banal, by putting them in a new context, i.e. the framework 
[...].  
The easy reading of each element that is realistically 
represented in the framework as part of the “already-seen” 
and therefore immediately recognizable, is accompanied by 
the novelty of an unsettling reading that is more concerned 
with the environment, the space, and the way in which the 
objects that are represented are assembled (ibid.: 154, our 
translation in English). 
The correspondence between the object and its meaning 
disappears: a word, as in the case of Wittgenstein; an image, 
as in the case of Magritte. The Belgian artist therefore 
shares Wittgenstein’s thesis that the signs are arbitrary and 
do not possess any (ontological) bond of referentiality with 
the things. 
One should bear in mind that to Magritte there are three 
cognitive levels: reality (the level belonging to the daily weft 
of conventions), sub-reality (the level perceived in a dream), 
surreality (released by the banal sense). The purpose of 
Magritte’s painting will thus be to bring the real to the surreal, 
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that is, to leave behind conventions and show its 
mystery. This explains the gap between image and idea, 
between the object and its representation. The offset of the 
plans, following Magritte, is even more fragmented. The 
levels are varied and Magritte provides a list contained 
in Words and Pictures published in 1929 (see Magritte 1979: 
52-53). The illustration proposed by the artist which best 
exemplifies the diversity of the levels is the one in which we 
have the image of a horse, the painting of a horse on a 
canvas and the word “horse” uttered by a man, accompanied 
by the following caption: “An object never fulfils the same 
tasks as its name or its image” (ibid.: 52-53). 
 
 
 
 
 
The arbitrariness, as Magritte argues, is commonly accepted 
because it belongs to a network of habits and conventions 
that are part of reality. 
Conversely, in the painting The Key to Dreams (1930), 
Magritte reveals the conventional nature of the linguistic 
sign, by representing four objects with no connection 
between one another, with the some names which do not 
correspond to the object described by the caption, if not in 
the last case. In this way, Magritte emphasizes the autonomy 
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of the image and the conventionality of the sign which, if not 
disclosed, may drop into the kind of mistakes which make us 
believe that the image of a pipe is a pipe (i.e. that there is a 
correlation between image and object). According Magritte, 
on the contrary, an image can stand for any object, and the 
same can be said for names. For this reason he can 
arbitrarily redistribute verbal descriptions and pictorial 
representations so that the captions do not match the 
images. To sum up, Magritte’s paintings resorts to what 
Wittgenstein calls “language games”. 
From The words and images some theoretical reflections 
also emerge that reveal the similarity between the 
philosopher and the artist. In Wittgenstein’s view, learning a 
language does not mean knowing the names, and the use of 
words is determined by rules that are to be found in certain 
“forms of life” (Lebensform) flowing from specific human 
“activities”. To Magritte, representations function similarly: in 
order to represent an object, an image must entertain 
relations with it, it should not resemble it: “Sometimes the 
name of an object stands for an image. A word can take the 
stand for an object in reality. An image can stand for a word 
in a sentence” (ibid.), says the painter. Anything can stand 
for an object if there is – in Wittgenstein’s words - consensus 
of use. 
In the painting The proper meaning (1928-29), the words 
“femme triste” replace the face of a sad woman, 
demonstrating that the similarity is an accessory element - 
certainly not necessary - of the reference. The same thing 
happens in Man on his way to the horizon which depicts a 
man’s shoulders surrounded by a few spots that bear the 
words: gun, chair, horse, clouds, horizon. In this painting - 
Foucault notes - there is something more than the proper 
sense. Here the words simply replace the face, they do not 
replace absent objects, they do not occupy empty spaces, 
but bulky masses that otherwise would not give the 
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impression of what they represent (see Foucault 1978: 55-56 
). Here the arbitrarity of the relationship between image / 
word / object is celebrated. 
Notwithstanding this, there is another emblematic painting in 
this regard: The Alphabet of Revelations (1928). It consists 
of two panels: the first is a representation of four objects (a 
pipe, a bird, a key, a leaf), the second is a twisted wire. Here 
it seems that everything obeys the laws of plastic 
representation and it seems that the words do not 
creep. However, on closer inspection, one can notice a tear 
in the canvas showing that those are just figures that are well 
separated from the legend accompanying them (the twisted 
wire is actually a tangle of terms). The report of the things 
with their designation is put at risk. 
Such problems also occur in the case of portraits, where the 
referent is right there, in front of the painter, who cannot 
“miss” the object. Instead, in this case too, the claims of the 
subject are not satisfied. There is a 1937 
painting, Reproduction prohibited, in which Magritte skillfully 
demonstrates the impossibility of the painting by proposing a 
character depicted from its back in front of a mirror which, 
instead of reflecting the face, represents once again his 
back: 
The character that is portrayed portrays him/herself [...]. 
While the portrait should return to better represent, enhance, 
beautify his patron through strategies of adjustments – as 
this is the historical origin of the portrait -, on the other hand, 
as an art [...] the painting faithfully depicts the figure, and in 
each portrait the face will re-turn, turning elsewhere, never 
conforming to its model (L. Ponzio 2010: 96, our translation 
in English).  
The same can be said for the self-portrait, in which the artist 
is apparently the master of himself, but in reality he is unable 
to capture his own identity, which retracts and (re)turn. The 
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identity is beyond our control to ourselves as we have not no 
power on the self. 
Magritte’s painting, “by exaggerating to parody, loyalty and 
high precision with respect to ‘reality’, it ridicules any attempt 
to represent objects ‘as they are’” (ibid.), including their 
identity. The object “harms the painting” (ibid.) and the 
relationship between the things and their designation is 
dissolved. 
At this point it becomes easier to understand the relationship 
between the Belgian painter and the Austrian philosopher: 
rather than a juxtaposition, their combination is revealed in 
its nature of successful theoretical relationship. 
While to Wittgenstein names are not pictures of reality, 
analogously Magritte does not consider pictorial 
representations as a mirror of reality. If Wittgenstein makes 
use of the well-known theory of “language games” to explain 
the way language works, Magritte makes constant use of 
“visual games” and “aesthetic games”, in order to 
demonstrate the dissolution of the ontological link between 
sign and referent. Indeed, if by language we do not mean the 
ability to speak but - borrowing the term from the 
biosemiotics field (see Sebeok 1991; Ponzio-Petrilli 2008) - 
the ability to “shape” reality, seeing in the language as a 
“training device” species-specific  of the human animal that 
exists even in the absence of speech, there will be no 
difficulty to consider the Magritte’s paintings as real 
“language games”. If - as Augusto Ponzio argues – “the 
human sign is language” (cf. Ponzio 1998: 134) and all the 
manifestations (literature, painting, music, etc.) of human 
communication can be referred to as languages or 
“interpretant” of the language as a training device, also the 
“visual” games by the Belgian painter are to be considered 
as “language”. 
Wittgenstein and Magritte both working to combat the 
“enchantment” of language, by showing how the process of 
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denomination and representation are complex processes 
which require more than a mere reflection between object 
and image or name, and although Magritte is oriented 
towards the “social criticism” of conventions (paradigmatic in 
this regard is the Red model in which he denounces the 
human habit of putting on shoes as “monstrous”) and 
Wittgenstein remains in a horizon of philosophical reflection, 
the convergence of their paths is, on the one hand, very 
clear; on the other, it is theoretically fruitful, by proposing 
both a solution to the problem of semiotic meaning11 and a 
hermeneutic model for the paintings of the artist, as well as 
further examples and explanations of the new theory 
formulated by the philosopher. 
(transl. from Italian by Laura Centonze) 
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1
 By inter-semiotic translation or “transmutation” we mean – 
following Jakobson’s terminology – “the interpretation of linguistic 
[verbal] signs by means of a non-linguistic [non-verbal] sign system 
(cf. Jakobson 1966: 57, our translation in English) and vice versa. 
2
 It is interesting to note, among other things, that the positions of 
Wittgenstein and Magritte in relation to their own areas of interest 
may be seen as symmetrical, or better say, similar but 
reversed. While Wittgenstein is a philosopher who is often 
intolerant towards philosophy and its teaching but loves painting, 
architecture and music, Magritte is a painter who refuses the role 
of the artist and describes “painting” as “a bad word” which refers 
to “the heaviness and the pretentiousness” (cf. L. Ponzio 2010: 
103), preferring to be referred to as “the thinking man”. Two 
parallel biographies that ideally meet in the rejection of encoded 
roles, i.e. philosopher for Wittgenstein, artist for Magritte. 
3
 Wittgenstein talks about “depiction” (cf. propositions 2.1513, 
2.1514), by considering it a synonym of the term 
“representation”. Nonetheless, in light of some further 
developments in the field of semiotics, it would be useful to draw a 
distinction between the two concepts. In the depiction, “signs do 
not just stand for something else, but they are at the same 
time with something else that somehow escapes their 
representation, they do not only represent but they depict” (Caputo, 
2004: 12). Here, however, we shall use the term “depiction” as 
described by Wittgenstein. 
4
 Connectives that allow us to combine simple sentences are 
conjunctions such as “and”, “but”, phrases such as “if, then”, “if and 
only if” and so forth. For instance, given two propositions p and q , 
one can construct the complex proposition “if p then q”. 
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5
 On the broad and complex issue of the paradox of language we 
refer to Garroni 1986 and its careful critical reconsideration of his 
text in Caputo 2013. 
6
 On the relationship between language, thought and language 
games, compare Dell’Atti 2013: 83-85. 
7
 On the issue of  “regularity” in reference to language and 
creativity we should consider Garroni’s Creativity , where the Italian 
philosopher examines and endorses the Wittgenstein’s theory, by 
comparing - as suggested by the Austrian philosopher in 
his Philosophical Investigations - the linguistic activity with the 
conditions it requires [...] for the activity and conditions of the 
game" (Garroni [1978] 2010: 104); it is not in a game devoid of 
“legality”: “a game without any rules - as language - writes Garroni 
by directly borrowing Wittgenstein’s terminology (2010: 105) - 
would not be a strange game, but it is not at all a 
game”. “Creativity” - a typical feature of language, both for the 
“second” Wittgenstein and Garroni – is undocked from “legality” 
and would only be “a flatus vocis”(ivi: 133). 
8
 In order to understand the issue in a more detailed way, compare 
Caputo 2010a. 
9
 The titles of the paintings by Magritte that are chosen in order to 
disorientate the viewer, “are chosen - writes the Belgian artist - in 
such a way as to prevent to locate my paintings in a region that 
could underestimate their scope” (Magritte 1979:100, our 
translation in English). 
10
 Giorgo Cortenova writes, perhaps exaggerating: “semiotically 
speaking, the work by Magritte appears as a real ‘treaty’, in line 
with the postulates of de Saussure” (see Cortenova, 1991: 
7). What is interesting for our studies, however, is not to see how 
this sort of  “crypto-semiotics” Magritte can stand the comparison 
of systematisations and theories, but, on the contrary, to provide 
the latter a further “ordeal” so as to extend its scope. On the notion 
of “crypto-semiotics”, compare Caputo 2010b: 108-115. 
